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ABSTRACT
Intentional signalling plays a fundamental role in human communication. Mapping the taxonomic distribution of com-
parable capacities may thus shed light on the selective pressures that enabled the evolution of human communication.
Nonetheless, severe methodological issues undermine comparisons among studies, species and communicative modali-
ties. Here, we discuss three main obstacles that hinder comparative research of ‘first-order’ intentional signalling
(i.e. voluntary signalling in pursuit of a cognitively represented goal): (i) inconsistency in how behavioural hallmarks
are defined and operationalised, (ii) testing of behavioural hallmarks without statistical comparison to control conditions,
and (iii) bias against the publication of negative results. To address these obstacles, we present a four-step scheme with
20 statistical operational criteria to distinguish between non-intentional and first-order intentional signalling. Our unified
scheme applies to visual and audible signals, thereby validating comparison across communicative modalities and spe-
cies. This, in turn, promotes the generation and testing of hypotheses about the evolution of intentional communication.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Humans use sophisticated communication that seems
unrivalled in the animal kingdom (Tomasello, 2008;
Scott-Phillips, 2015b). One cluster of fundamental mecha-
nisms which facilitate this sophistication is intentional com-
munication: the ability to signal intentionally and to express
and interpret communicative intentions (Grice, 1957;
Sperber, 1994). These cognitive abilities enable virtually
open-ended flexibility by allowing every act to be loaded with
a communicative meaning, and to load the same act with dif-
ferent meanings according to the communicative intentions
that are being expressed (Sperber, 1994; Scott-Phillips, 2015-
a). For example, raising an empty glass can be a non-
communicative examination of its cleanliness, but the same
physical act becomes a communicative request for a refill or
an invitation to toast once it is accompanied by a look toward
a recipient. Philosophers of language, linguistics and com-
parative psychologists thus agree that intentionality is a key
mechanism in human communication (Grice, 1957;
Dennett, 1983; Sperber, 1994; Tomasello, 2008; Scott-
Phillips, 2015b; Townsend et al., 2017).
Understanding the taxonomic distribution of comparable
capacities is crucial to shedding light on the evolution of
human communication (Liebal et al., 2014; Townsend et
al., 2017). For instance, scholars relied on evidence that
non-human great apes gesture but do not vocalise intention-
ally, to develop the hypothesis that human language evolved
via the gestural modality (Tomasello, 2008). However, recent
evidence for intentional vocal communication in chimpan-
zees (Pan troglodytes) questions this idea (Liebal et al., 2014;
Schel et al., 2013). This controversy emphasises the urgent
need to improve methodologies distinguishing between
non-intentional signalling and even basic forms of intention-
ality to allow valid comparisons across species and communi-
cative modalities (Townsend et al., 2017; Graham
et al., 2019).
Here, we present a unified operational-level scheme to dis-
tinguish between non-intentional and ‘first-order’ inten-
tional signalling across species and the audible and visual
communicative modalities. We focus on these modalities as
they include modes of communication that have been specu-
lated to be the origin of human language (i.e. vocal and ges-
tural: Tomasello, 2008). In the following introductory
sections, we first outline the boundaries of our scheme by dif-
ferentiating between intentional signalling and ostensive
communication. Second, we contrast the mechanistic versus
intentional explanations for the mechanism which underlies
a signalling behaviour. Third, we discuss methodological
flaws that hinder reliable inference and systematic compari-
son of intentional signalling and how they are addressed by
the scheme.
(1) Intentional and ostensive communication
The term intentional communication is frequently used to
refer to overlapping, yet different, capacities (Ullrich,
Mittelbach & Liebal, 2020). Comparative psychologists,
who study non-human species, commonly use the term to
describe voluntarily signalling in pursuit of a cognitively
represented goal (hereafter ‘intentional signalling’: Scott-
Phillips, 2015b). Developmental psychologists, who study
pre-linguistic children, often add that the signaller should
understand the recipient as an intentional agent (Coggins &
Carpenter, 1981; Carpenter, Nagell & Tomasello, 1998).
Philosophers of language, who focus on adult humans, refer
to intentional communication as a mutual mindreading pro-
cess in which interlocutors express and interpret each other’s
communicative intentions (i.e. ostensive communication:
Scott-Phillips, 2015b). Intentional signalling in the sense that
is used in comparative psychology is, therefore, a prerequisite
for the intentional and ostensive communication that are dis-
cussed in developmental psychology and philosophy
(Coggins & Carpenter, 1981; Liebal et al., 2014). As efforts
are still being made to distinguish reliably between non-
intentional and intentional signalling in animals (Townsend
et al., 2017; Graham et al., 2019), the current paper focusses
on the more fundamental level of intentional signalling.
Following the work of previous scholars that have pin-
pointed important attributes of intentionality, we define
‘first-order’ intentional signalling (Dennett, 1983) as volun-
tary signalling (e.g. Tomasello & Call, 1997; Carpenter
et al., 1998; Liebal et al., 2014; Townsend et al., 2017) in pur-
suit of a cognitively represented goal (e.g. Bates, 1979; Coggins &
Carpenter, 1981; Dennett, 1983; Tomasello & Call, 1997;
Carpenter et al., 1998; Liebal et al., 2014; Scott-
Phillips, 2015b). ‘In pursuit’ links the signalling with the
cognitively represented goal, meaning the signaller believes
the signalling is a means to realise her goal (see Section II.2
for goal-directness).
Contrary to traditional definitions (e.g. Dennett, 1983;
Ullrich et al., 2020), our definition remains neutral about
whether the signaller believes that her signalling realises the
goal by affecting the intentional state of the recipient or by
other means (e.g. the signaller perceives the recipient as an
inanimate object that needs to be operated). We thereby
aim to lay the foundations for a layered framework to inves-
tigate intentional communication, in which first-order inten-
tional signalling is a necessary, but not sufficient, building
block for higher-order intentional communication. For
example, demonstrating first-order intentional signalling is
necessary to demonstrate second-order intentional signalling
(i.e. defined as first-order + the signaller believes her signal-
ling affects the intentional state of the recipient). Using our
scheme to show first-order intentional signalling thus does
not mean that the subject is incapable of higher-order inten-
tional communication.
(2) Mechanistic versus intentional explanations of
signalling
Our scheme aims to determine whether the production of a
specific signal is more likely to be based on non-intentional
or intentional mechanisms. To this end, it contrasts the
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‘mechanistic’ versus the ‘intentionality’ explanations as alter-
natives (Dennett, 1983; Liebal et al., 2014). The mechanistic
explanation postulates that the examined signal evolved as a
specific behavioural solution to a specific ‘problem’
(Harman, 1983; Vail, Manica & Bshary, 2013) and that sig-
nalling requires no mental state in the signaller (i.e. ‘zero-
order’ intentionality: Dennett, 1983; Townsend
et al., 2017). Vervet monkeys (Chlorocebus pygerythrus), for
instance, give different alarm calls when detecting a leopard
or an eagle (Wegdell, Hammerschmidt & Fischer, 2019).
Natural selection may hardwire the triggering of these spe-
cific calls upon the perception of specific predator types
since they benefit the signaller or its kin (Zahavi &
Zahavi, 1997). Since such signals evolve as specialist solu-
tions, their most important hallmark is lack of flexibility
regarding when and how they are executed
(Dennett, 1983; Liebal et al., 2014).
By contrast, the intentional explanation postulates that the
signaller has at least some voluntary control over the signalling
and a belief that it is a means to realise her goal
(Dennett, 1983; Liebal et al., 2014). These physiological and
cognitive capacities enable the key characteristics which allow
inferring intentional signalling: (i) adjustability (i.e. dynamic
adjustment to the recipient’s response and the environmental
and social conditions), and (ii) generality (i.e. intentionality
underlies the production of various signals of the species).
As pointed out by Dennett (1983), each of the behavioural
hallmarks that are traditionally used to infer intentionality
can be explained by mechanistic processes. Even demonstra-
tion of several hallmarks of intentionality in the same signal
can be explained by a combination of mechanistic processes
[e.g. genetically hardwired signalling that is elaborated
through conditioning (Fischer & Price, 2017; Schnell
et al., 2021)]. Prominent scholars have thus argued that a defin-
itive test to distinguish between non-intentional and inten-
tional signalling in animals may not be possible
(Dennett, 1983; Liebal et al., 2014; Townsend et al., 2017).
Instead, they call for the presentation of ‘converging’ evidence
that makes intentionality the more plausible and parsimonious
explanation than the mechanistic one. This rationale is sum-
marised in what can be called the ‘plausibility argument’.
(1) There is a certain probability for the emergence
(in evolution/ontogeny) of each mechanism that
adjusts a signalling behaviour to the circumstances.
(2) There is no reason to believe that the emergence of one
mechanism increases the probability of additional
mechanisms to evolve.
From these two points can be derived an intermediate con-
clusion: the probability that several mechanisms would
evolve to produce highly adjustable signals decreases with
the number of mechanisms involved.
(3) First-order intentional signalling requires voluntary
control over signalling and a belief that the signalling
is a means to realise the goal.
(4) Voluntary control and believing that signalling behav-
iours are a means to realise one’s goals enable high
adjustability of various signalling behaviours.
Together, these four points allow a final conclusion: the
more different hallmarks of adjustability are demonstrated
in different signalling behaviours of a species, the greater
the probability that these signals are facilitated by intention-
ality rather than a combination of several non-intentional
mechanisms.
Accordingly, for any particular signal, the scheme favours
the intentionality over the mechanistic explanation upon (i)
demonstration of numerous hallmarks of intentionality in
the tested signal (i.e. adjustability); which is also combined
with (ii) demonstration of intentionality in at least two signals
from the same communicative modality of the species
(i.e. generality). Being from the same communicative modal-
ity ensures substantial evidence for intentionally in this
modality since voluntary control over one modality does
not necessarily entail the same in other modalities.
(3) Obstacles to inference and systematic
comparison of first-order intentional signalling
Three main obstacles hinder valid inference and systematic
comparison of intentionality in animals. First, inconsistency
in how hallmarks of intentionality are defined and operatio-
nalised prevents systematic comparison among studies, spe-
cies and communicative modalities (Liebal et al., 2014;
Graham et al., 2019). Progress toward uniformity has recently
been made in the framework developed by Townsend
et al. (2017). However, this framework focuses on the defining
conditions of first-order intentionality and is not meant to
overcome inconsistency at the operational level (Graham
et al., 2019). For instance, the framework of Townsend
et al. (2017) suggests inferring goal-directed signalling by
assessing elaboration of signalling. But little is said about
what exactly constitutes elaboration and how it should be
tested. Our scheme facilitates systematic comparison by
addressing this operational level. To this end, we reviewed
empirical studies on pre-linguistic human children and ani-
mals, selected the most rigorous operational criteria (see
remarks for each criterion) and adjusted them for audible
and visual signals.
Second, behavioural hallmarks are often examined with-
out statistical comparison to control conditions (Graham
et al., 2019). This is manifested in two ways: (i) a hallmark of
intentionality is considered to be fulfilled if it was exhibited
in the majority of signalling events (e.g. Pika &
Bugnyar, 2011). Such operationalisation, however, does not
test whether the behaviour examined is indeed a manifesta-
tion of the hallmark or not. For instance, testing whether
the ‘response-waiting’ hallmark is exhibited in the majority
of events (e.g. manifested by a post-signalling pause of at least
2 s while maintaining visual contact with the recipient: Fröh-
lich et al., 2016) leaves untested the possibility that the
observed pause is used to rest after many similar behaviours,
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rather than waiting for a response. (ii) Studies on gestural rep-
ertoire often use a ‘filtering approach’, in which a data set of
signalling events is filtered to include only events that exhibit
one/few hallmarks of intentionality (e.g. Genty et al., 2009;
Hobaiter & Byrne, 2014). Focusing on the level of a signalling
event, however, prevents statistical comparison with control
conditions. Moreover, since some events of non-intentional
signalling may exhibit hallmarks of intentionality for other
reasons, filtering approaches are likely to find alleged events
of intentionality in almost any data set of a given signal
and, therefore, to qualify the signal as intentional (type I
error). For example, if response-waiting is defined as a post-
signalling pause longer than 2 s, some ‘response-waiting’
events may be found even if the examined species exhibits a
skewed distribution of post-signalling pauses in which most
events lack any pause (Fig. 1; see also operational criterion
1a1 in Section II.2). For these reasons, filtering approaches
are not suitable to qualify a signalling behaviour as first-order
intentional, although they may be used in follow-up studies
once the signal or a specific communicative modality of the
species has been qualified as intentional.
To allow more rigorous testing of behavioural hallmarks,
each operational criterion in our scheme was designed to
compare episodes statistically with the alleged hallmark
against control conditions and/or to test ‘adequate mani-
festation’ of the hallmark (see Table 1). In addition, the
scheme is designed to test whether the production of a specific
signal fulfils hallmarks of intentionality across communica-
tive interactions and not necessarily in each signalling event
(Table 1). Namely, it focuses on the signal level in order to
infer a species’ capacity to signal intentionally in a specific
communicative modality (e.g. the finding that chimpanzees
produce a specific type of gesture intentionally suggests that
chimpanzees are capable of intentional gestural
communication).
Third, there is a bias toward positive results (Liebal
et al., 2014) that obstructs the understanding of the taxo-
nomic distribution of intentionality. Species that seem capa-
ble of non-intentional signalling only are rarely tested for
hallmarks of intentionality and/or studies with negative
results are not often published. Species that have been dem-
onstrated to signal intentionally are thus highlighted
(e.g. great apes: Ullrich et al., 2020), while it remains unclear
whether other species are incapable of intentional signalling
or have simply not been tested (e.g. birds). Nonetheless, iden-
tifying which species are incapable of intentional signalling in
certain/all communicative modalities is essential if the taxo-
nomic map of intentional communication is to be informa-
tive for generating and testing hypotheses about its
evolution. To facilitate the recognition of negative results,
we also present counterevidence for the behavioural hall-
marks of intentionality in our scheme. Note that these are
counterevidence only for the presence of the hallmark dis-
cussed. They, therefore, cannot preclude that the signalling
behaviour in question is intentional without additional coun-
terevidence for other behavioural hallmarks.
II. THE SCHEME
Here, we endorse the theoretical framework of Townsend
et al. (2017) and the three conditions it proposes as necessary
to qualify a behaviour as first-order intentional signalling: (i)
voluntary production, (ii) goal-directness and (iii) changing
the recipient’s behaviour in ways that are conducive to realise
the signaller’s goal (Table 2). As our scheme focuses on the
operational level, the reader is referred to Townsend
et al. (2017) and references in the appropriate places for justi-
fication of these conditions. The scheme consists of four oper-
ational steps to infer these three conditions. For each
condition, we discuss several hallmarks and for each
hallmark, we present at least one operational criterion. All
hallmarks and operational criteria are formulated in non-
specific terms to enable each of them to test audible and
visual signals.
The scheme focuses on ‘real-time’ communication that
allows for examining the dynamic correspondence between
signalling and immediate response (see Table 1). Non-
dynamic signalling (see Table 1) may nonetheless be inten-
tional, but such instances are not fully covered by the scheme.
(1) First step: inferring the signaller’s goal through
the detection of statistical regularities
This is a preparatory step to test the first and third conditions
for first-order intentionality (i.e. goal-directed signalling and
that signalling realises the signaller’s goal). Following previ-
ous authors (e.g. Hobaiter & Byrne, 2014; Townsend
Fig 1. Hypothetical distribution of the duration of pause after
the production of signal X. The dotted line represents a defined
threshold of response-waiting (i.e. post-signalling pause longer
than 2 s). As 10% of signalling events exhibit ‘response-waiting’,
a filtering approach for inference of intentionality will only
examine these events and may qualify the production of signal
X as fulfilling the response-waiting hallmark. Consequently, it
may qualify signal X as intentional, despite exhibiting little
evidence for the response-waiting hallmark overall.
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et al., 2017), the signaller’s goal can be evident in the changes
in the recipient’s behaviour that are followed by a cessation of
signalling.
Operational criterion 1: coding all behavioural
changes of the recipient throughout various communicative
interactions (e.g. stop behaviour X, start behaviour Y), fol-
lowed by testing which changes are statistically likely to be
followed by a cessation of signalling behaviour (Fig. 2).
Remarks: (i) behaviours that elicit an aversive response from
the signaller should be excluded to rule out changes that
despite being a response to signalling and repeatedly ending
it, do not represent a plausible outcome for the signaller
[e.g. physical aggression towards the signaller (Hobaiter &
Byrne, 2014)].
(ii) Our operational criterion statistically accounts for all
changes in the recipient’s behaviour, regardless of whether
they were followed by the cessation of signalling. It thereby
differs from the ‘apparently satisfactory outcome’ criterion
(Cartmill & Byrne, 2010; Hobaiter & Byrne, 2014), which
only considers changes that were followed by cessation of sig-
nalling. We consider four advantages to our approach. First,
it infers the signaller’s goal statistically by comparing the
probability of different behavioural changes to terminate sig-
nalling. Second, it statistically accounts for changes that were
followed by a cessation of signalling by chance (which may
have been considered as the ‘secondary’ or ‘tertiary’
meanings of a signal by Hobaiter & Byrne, 2014). Third, it
can detect more than one behavioural change that is likely
to be followed by a cessation of signalling. Fourth, it points
out behavioural changes that should not be considered as
the signaller’s goal.
(iii) Inferring the signaller’s goal when signalling is not
clearly directed towards specific recipients (see hallmarks 1a
and 1e for examples) is challenging. This challenge especially
applies to audible signals, which can pass through physical
obstacles and make it difficult to identify a recipient’s
response. We thus suggest that signals that are produced in
the absence of known recipients and do not receive a real-
time response may be non-dynamic communication (see
Table 1) that is not addressed by this scheme. To infer the
goal of signals that are produced in the presence of potential
recipients (e.g. conspecifics, group members, predators) but
are not clearly directed towards them, we propose applying
operation criterion 1 to some of these potential recipients.
An absence of a distinct response by these recipients should
be considered as evidence for non-intentional signalling such
as, for example, signalling induced by arousal (Liebal
et al., 2014; see also Table 2).
Counterevidence for the examined behaviour being a signal: none of
the behavioural changes of the audience is statistically likely
to be followed by a cessation of ‘signalling’ behaviour. In this
case, what is thought to be ‘signalling’ may rather be a non-
Table 1. Glossary of terms
Term Definition
An adequate manifestation of a
behavioural hallmark
To ensure the realisation of the goal, the behavioural hallmark is adjusted to the dynamic
response of the recipient and the environmental and social conditions in which signalling
occurs (see examples in each behavioural hallmark).
Real-time communication Signalling that is aimed at realising a goal promptly. It, therefore, allows examining the
dynamic correspondence between signalling and responding. For instance, a gesture aiming
to solicit the recipient to follow the signaller (see babbler walk signal in Table 3) or a
vocalisation aiming to attract group members to a food source (Vitale et al., 2003).
Non-dynamic signalling Signalling that is not directed towards a specific recipient, but to any potential recipient that
may be or would be present within signalling range. It, therefore, seldom involves real-time
correspondence between signalling and responding. Examples include calling by crickets
(Forrest, 1982) and light production by fireflies (Lampyridae) to attract potential mates.
Standard complying response (SCR) time
unit
The median duration of time from the beginning of signalling until the recipient starts to
realise the signaller’s goal. An SCR time unit should be calculated for each signal in a
specific community and during a specific study.
A failure to realise the signaller’s goal has
been clearly indicated
When (i) the recipient does not start to respond according to the signaller’s goal after three
SCR time units; or (ii) the recipient’s behaviour/the environmental conditions have been
changed in a way that obstructs the signaller’s goal (Bates, 1979). For example, the recipient
moves far away from the signaller or a predator appears.
Complying recipient A recipient that starts to respond within one SCR time unit in a way that realises the signaller’s
goal and continues to respond until this goal is fully realised (e.g. communicative interaction
6 in Fig. 2).
Non-complying recipient A recipient that (i) does not start to realise the signaller’s goal within one SCR time unit (e.g.
communicative interactions 2 and 3 in Fig. 2), or (ii) stops responding before the signaller’s
goal is fully realised (e.g. communicative interaction 5 in Fig. 2), or (iii) does not respond at
all (e.g. communicative interactions 1, 9 and 10 in Fig. 2).
Signalling event The production of a signal.
Communicative interaction An interaction that starts at the beginning of the first signalling event and lasts until the
signaller’s goal is realised or failure to realise the signaller’s goal has been clearly indicated.
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communicative behaviour (e.g. foraging behaviour, tool use)
or a manifestation of arousal (Liebal et al., 2014).
(2) Second step: inferring goal-directed signalling
Definition of goal-directed signalling: the production of a signal
based on two necessary conditions: the signaller (i) believes
that the signal is a means to realise her goal (belief criterion)
and (ii) the realisation of the goal is desired by/adaptive for
the signaller (desire criterion) (for review see Dennett, 1983;
De Wit & Dickinson, 2009).
Belief criterion
Note that first-order intentional signalling describes the
intentional state of the signaller only. It does not require per-
ceiving the recipient as an intentional agent, or a true belief
about how her signalling realises the goal (Dennett, 1983;
De Wit & Dickinson, 2009).
Behavioural hallmark 1a: adequate response-waiting
Response-waiting is a hallmark of expectation that the sig-
nalling will affect the recipient (Bates, 1979; De Wit &
Dickinson, 2009; Cartmill & Byrne, 2010).
Definition of adequate response-waiting: the signaller monitors
the recipient (starting at any point from the onset of signalling
until shortly after the first signalling event in the interaction)
until the latter starts to respond in ways that realise the
signaller’s goal or until failure to realise her goal has been
clearly indicated (Table 1).
Operational criterion 1a1: testing whether the examined signal
is more likely to be followed by response-waiting than a con-
trol behaviour is likely to be followed by monitoring the audi-
ence’s behaviour for at least one SCR time unit (see
Table and Fig. 3). ‘Control behaviour’ is defined as a non-
communicative behaviour that is similar to the tested signal
(e.g. see object presentation in Table 3).
Example: huu calls in Table 3.
Operational criterion 1a2: testing for correspondence between
the recipient’s behaviour at the time of being monitored and
the signaller’s behaviour after the act of monitoring. Namely,
whether the signaller adjusts her post-monitoring behaviour
to the recipient’s behaviour.
Example: babbler walk in Table 3.
Remarks on behavioural hallmark 1a: (i) traditional operational
criteria of response-waiting require that after signalling the
signaller pauses and monitors the recipient’s behaviour for
a minimum number of seconds (e.g. Cartmill &
Byrne, 2010; Graham et al., 2019). Our definition differs
from these criteria in three important ways: firstly, monitor-
ing does not have to start after the end of signalling. It may
start any time between the onset of signalling and shortly
after the end of the first signalling event. This enables testing
Table 2. Operational scheme to infer first-order intentional signalling
Condition Sub-condition Behavioural hallmark
Goal-directed
signalling
Belief criterion* (1) Absence of response to signalling (see text in step 1 of the scheme)**
(1a) Adequate response-waiting
(1b) Adequate elaboration of signalling
(1c) Adequate interchangeable use of signals
(1d) Communicative tool use
(1e) Adjustment of signalling behaviour to the sensory perception of
recipients
Desire criterion* (1f) Adequate persistence of signalling
Voluntary
signalling*
The execution of signalling is not
unconditionally triggered by specific stimuli
(2a) Preparation for signalling
(2b) Behavioural dissociations between the external stimulus and
signalling
(2c) Adequate coupling and decoupling of signals
(2d) Selective signalling according to the presence of recipients
(2e) Between-communities interchangeable use of signals
(1c) Adequate interchangeable use of signals
The execution of signalling is not completely
genetically determined
(2f) Premature termination of signalling behaviour
Signalling is sex-specific (see remarks in behavioural hallmark 2g)**
(2h) Selective production/withholding of signalling according to
complex conditions
(1c) Adequate interchangeable use of signals
(2e) Between-communities interchangeable use of signals
The form of signalling is not completely
genetically determined
(1b) Adequate elaboration of signalling
(1d) Communicative tool use
(1e) Adjustment of signalling behaviour to the sensory perception of
recipients
Signalling behaviour realises the signaller’s goal* (3) Signalling is likely to change the recipient’s behaviour in ways that
are conducive to realising the signaller’s goal
*To qualify as first-order intentional signalling, a behaviour must fulfil at least one operational criterion from each of the four conditions/sub-
conditions with an asterisk. Each behavioural hallmark can be considered once.
**Can only provide evidence against intentional signalling.
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signals consisting of one prolonged signalling event that lasts
until the recipient realises the signaller’s goal or failure has
been clearly indicated (e.g. object presentation in Table 3).
Secondly, it does not require a pause from acting. As in
humans, non-human animals may be able to communicate
while performing other tasks (e.g. vocalising while foraging).
A distinct pause, thus, is not a necessary characteristic of
expectation. Instead, we highlight the monitoring of recipi-
ents as an essential characteristic of expectation.
Thirdly, we emphasise that the duration of monitoring
should be adjusted to the recipient’s response. In our opin-
ion, a fixed duration of post-signalling monitoring, which is
independent of the recipient’s response, rather characterises
stereotypic behaviours.
(ii) Interactions in which the recipient responds at any time
between the onset of signalling until shortly after the first sig-
nalling event (e.g. within <0.1 SCR time units) should be
excluded from the analysis of operational criterion 1a1 since
response-waiting is not needed (Genty et al., 2009).
(iii) As infants become confident in their signalling, they are
less likely to monitor the recipient and may only monitor
non-complying recipients (Table 1; Bates, 1979). Hence,
our criterion does not require demonstration of response-
waiting in most interactions, but that it will be statistically
more prevalent after the tested signal than after a control
behaviour (Fig. 3).
(iv) The way a signaller monitors the recipient is likely to
depend on the recipient’s common response (Liebal
et al., 2014). Visual responses (e.g. approaching the recipient)
are more likely to be monitored visually. For example, by
gazing at the recipient or frequent head alternations towards
the recipient (Bates, 1979; see also babbler walk and huu calls
in Table 3). Audible responses (e.g. contact calls) may be
monitored audibly (i.e. by remaining quiet and/or raising
the head to listen to a reply) but also visually (visual scanning
of the surroundings).
(v) Monitoring can be discrete or continuous. For instance,
visual monitoring may involve discrete head alternations
Fig 2. Signalling events in relation to changes in the recipient’s behaviour. Across communicative interactions, changes to the
‘triangle’ and ‘rhombus’ behaviours are repeatedly followed by a cessation of signalling behaviours Z and Y (in contrast to
changes to the ‘square’, ‘X’ and ‘circle’ behaviours). The goals in producing these signals can thus be regarded as changing the
recipient’s behaviour to the ‘triangle’ or ‘rhombus’ behaviours.
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towards the recipient or continuous gazing at the recipient
(compare monitoring in babbler walk with object presenta-
tion signals in Table 3). Operational criterion 1a2 is only suit-
able for discrete monitoring.
(vi) Operational criterion 1a2 is only suitable when the sig-
naller’s goal requires a prolonged response, during which the
signaller may need to adjust signalling or re-engage the recip-
ient before her goal is fully realised (e.g. babbler walk in
Table 3).
(vii) The focal unit of operational criterion 1a1 is the com-
municative interaction. Namely, the coded parameter is
whether the signaller monitored the recipient’s behaviour
at any time between the onset of the first signalling event
and until the latter starts to realise the signaller’s goal
(yes/no), regardless of whether the signaller re-signals during
this period or not. The focal unit of operational criterion 1a2
is each signalling event, and the coded parameters are the
recipient’s behaviour when she was monitored, and the sig-
naller’s behaviour after each act of monitoring.
(viii) Operational criterion 1a2 is superior to criterion 1a1
for two reasons. First, demonstrating that the signaller uses
the information that was gathered in monitoring to adjust
her next actions confirms that the behaviour defined as
‘monitoring’ is indeed used to monitor the recipient. Second,
it demonstrates continuous adjustability of signalling, which
is a key characteristic of intentionality.
Counterevidence for adequate response-waiting being present (exam-
ples): (i) signallers do not monitor the recipient after signal-
ling; (ii) signallers monitor the recipient’s behaviour for a
fixed duration of time regardless of the behaviour of the
recipient; (iii) ‘monitoring’ the recipient’s behaviour is likely
to follow the production of the signal as much as the control
behaviour; (iv) signallers continue to wait for a response even
if the recipient was experimentally removed (see tandem run-
ning in ants in Table 3); (v) signallers do not change their post-
monitoring behaviour in accordance with the recipient’s
behaviour.
Behavioural hallmark 1b: adequate elaboration of
signalling
Adequate elaboration of signalling demonstrates flexibility
in signalling behaviour. Moreover, it suggests an ability for
means–end dissociation in response to monitoring of the
recipient’s behaviour (i.e. believing that the signalling is a
‘means’ that can be separated from the realisation of the
‘end’ goal) (Carpenter et al., 1998; De Wit &
Dickinson, 2009).
Definition of elaboration of signalling: within a communica-
tive interaction, at least one signalling event differs qualita-
tively from the others by (i) the addition and/or
subtraction of a new element in the signal (e.g. adding a
vocal element to a gestural signal), or (ii) the performance
of a completely different signal (i.e. interchangeable use
of signals).
Operational criterion 1b (adequate elaboration of signalling): (i) test-
ing whether elaboration is more likely to occur in interactions
with non-complying recipients than in interactions with com-
plying recipients (Table 1), while (ii) employing different
forms of elaboration across communicative interactions that
are aimed to realise the same goal.
Examples: babbler walk and headstand signals (Table 3).
Remarks: (i) elaboration of signalling requires a qualitative
change in signalling within the same interaction. By contrast,
adequate elaboration of signalling requires that elaboration
is selectively applied across communicative interactions.
(ii) Quantitative modifications of the signal
(i.e. exaggeration) may result from increased arousal due to
a continuous stimulus (Liebal et al., 2014). We, therefore,
do not consider these as evidence for means–end
dissociation.
Counterevidence for adequate elaboration being present (examples): (i)
the same signal is always used to realise the same goal, even
when interacting with non-complying recipients; (ii) signal-
ling behaviour is stereotyped (e.g. tandem running in ants
in Table 3); (iii) elaboration of signalling is not more likely
to be used towards non-complying than complying recipi-
ents; (iv) signalling is always elaborated in the same way.
Behavioural hallmark 1c: adequate interchangeable use of
signals
The use of different signals to realise the same goal and/or
usage of the same signal to realise different goals demon-
strates complex relationships between signal selection and
goals (i.e. there is not a one-to-one correspondence between
a specific signal and goal; Fig. 4). It thereby suggests
means–end dissociation and voluntary control over signalling
(Genty et al., 2009; Liebal et al., 2014), especially if signals are
implemented to fit different social and environmental con-
texts adequately.
Fig 3. Hypothetical evidence for response-waiting by
operational criterion 1a1. Although signallers did not
demonstrate response-waiting in the majority of signalling
events, they were significantly more likely to monitor the
recipient behaviour following the production of signal X
(45/100 events) than after a control behaviour (i.e. a non-
communicative behaviour that is physically similar to the
tested signal; 20/100 events). 80 signalling events in which the
recipient responded before the signalling ended were excluded
from the analysis.
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Modality: gestural Exemplary operational criteria
Species: birds – Arabian
babbler (Turdoides
squamiceps)







picks an arbitrary object
in his/her beak and




signaller gazes at the
recipient and pauses for
more than 3 s or gazes at
the recipient and
performs her next action




Signallers signal only at
times and/or locations
that are concealed from




alpha male, the latter
stops signalling. As








Arabian babblers are more
likely to bend over in a
copulation posture
and/or approach a
signaller that presents an
object than a conspecific





Goal: to solicit the
recipient to follow the
signaller for copulation




























faces a nestmate’s head,
grasps it on the
mandibles and pulls it
2–20 cm forwards. It
then loosens the grip,
turns around 180 and
presents its gaster to the
recipient. If the recipient
touches the signaller’s





leader’s hind legs or
gaster. The leader drags










No elaboration as “this
behavioural sequence is
very stereotyped”
(Hölldobler et al., 1974,
p. 112).
In addition, if the recipient
does not follow the
recruiting ant, the latter
may physically carry it to
the desired destination.
If the leader and follower
are separated, the leader
waits passively for about
110 s regardless of




between finding the new
nest and the scout’s
arrival at its current nest
and finding a nestmate
to recruit. However, it is
not clear whether scouts
perform other
behaviours between
discovering the new nest
and returning to recruit
a nestmate.
Goal: to lead a nestmate
to a newly discovered
nest.
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of wing shivering and/or
distinct vocalisation
towards dependant
fledglings, then turn and











all these cases, the
signaller re-positions
herself within the visual
field of the recipient and
re-signals.
Caretakers are more likely
to elaborate their
signalling in interactions
with recipients that do
not follow them within
30 s from the beginning













The duration of signalling
behaviour (measured
from the beginning of
the first signalling event
until the end of the last
signalling event in the
interaction) was longer
when communicating to
a fledgling that did not
follow the signaller





arrival at a new shelter.
Interchangeable use of
signals
Visual monitoring of the recipient’s behaviour
Goal: to solicit recipient/s
to follow the signaller/s.
Caretakers often used the
babbler walk signal to
solicit fledglings to follow
them. Yet they were
more likely to replace
the babbler walk signal
with a beak gaping signal
if the fledglings did not
follow them (Ben Mocha
et al., 2019) and to use
this signal first when an
urgent response was
needed. For example,
when a predator was
nearby and during late-
evening travels to the
roosting tree (Y. Ben
Mocha, personal
observations).
During most communicative interactions, the signaller
alternates her head towards the recipient at least once.
After these ‘checking looks’, the behaviour of the
signaller (moves forward/ returns to the recipient) was
more likely to be in accordance with the recipient’s
behaviour (follows/does not follow).
Headstand
(Vail et al., 2013)
Modality: gestural Exemplary operational criteria
Species: fish – roving
coral grouper
(Plectropomus pessuliferus
marisrubri), coral trout (P.
leopardus)








Signallers were more likely
to switch to the
‘horizontal shimmy’
signal when the recipient
swam away than in
interactions in which the
recipient swam towards
the pointed location.
Signallers only produce the headstand gesture during
hunting attempts in which an octopus was within 10 m
of the signaller, but not during hunting attempts in
which no octopus was observed nearby.
Goal: to indicate the
location of hidden prey
(Continues)
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Operational criterion 1c: within a community, inferring the
signaller’s goal for different signals (step 1 in this scheme).
Identifying signals with the same goal, or different goals that
are being realised by the same signal. Speculating a role for
the implementation of different signals in different contexts.
Testing this hypothesis on a new data set.
Examples: babbler walk (Table 3), see also within-
community interchangeability in gestural communication
of chimpanzees (Hobaiter & Byrne, 2014) and gorillas (Gorilla
gorilla) (Genty et al., 2009).
Remarks: (i) adequate interchangeability of signals provides
evidence against the alternative explanation that elaboration
may result from “closely related signals [that] share a com-
mon arousal-based production mechanism” (Graham et al.,
2019, p. 8). If a common arousal-based production mecha-
nism accounts for elaboration, one prediction is that alterna-
tive signals will be produced randomly across communicative
interactions. By contrast, interchangeability of signals to real-
ise the same goal across interactions – if adequately imple-
mented according to different social and environmental
contexts – is counterevidence for this alternative explanation.
(ii) Another version of the alternative explanation of Gra-
ham et al. (2019) is that a common arousal-based production
mechanism triggers different signalling behaviours according
to different arousal thresholds. In this case, signals would not
be produced randomly. This alternative can be ruled out if
the social and environmental contexts in which the different
signals are used are presumed to induce a similar arousal
Table 3. (Cont.)








Selective signalling according to the recipient’s knowledge
Description: the
signaller aligns her head
and body (45 below its
resting position) to form
a straight line with the
beak ‘pointing’ towards
a predator.
Birds pointed when an eagle model was placed in locations that were not visible to other
groupmembers but did not point when the model was visible to other groupmembers.
In addition, the last bird joining the mobbing group did not point. This counts as
evidence against the signal being involuntarily triggered by perceiving a predator or
due to higher arousal that is caused by conspecifics’ presence.
Goal: to indicate the

























are short and low-
pitched calls. Alarm
huus are longer and
louder than soft huus.
Waa barks are loud and
abrupt sounds.
Soft huus were produced
after an encounter with a
snake model regardless
of conspecifics’ presence
(Schel et al., 2013).
Alarm huus and Waa
barks were more likely to
be given when a ‘friend’
of the caller approached
the snake model (Schel
et al., 2013).
Soft huus were more likely
to be given upon
approaching of a group
member that had not
seen the snake and was
not likely to hear





Goal: all three types of
calls are produced in




Crockford et al. (2012)
and Schel et al. (2013)
with conflicting results
(see discussion in




Temporal dissociation between exposure to the
stimulus and signalling
Chimpanzees alternated
their gaze between the
snake and another
chimpanzee at a higher
rate during calling bouts
than when they were not
calling (Schel et
al., 2013).
Startle responses occurred less than 0.1 s following
exposure to a snake model and were temporally
dissociated from soft huus, which were produced
1.7 ± 0.4 s (mean ± SD) after exposure to a snake and
0.9 ± 0.6 s after the end of the startle response.
Behavioural dissociation was not tested (Crockford
et al., 2012).
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level (e.g. signalling is modified according to the availability
of the recipient’s sensory perception, not according to preda-
tor presence; see hallmark 1d).
Counterevidence for adequate interchangeable use of signals being pre-
sent (examples): (i) the same signal is always used to realise the
same goal; (ii) across communicative interactions, different
signals are used in random order to realise the same goal.
Behavioural hallmark 1d: communicative tool use
Using tools for communication provides evidence for the
belief that the tool (and therefore the signalling) is a means
for realising the goal (for discussion and definition of tool
use, see Smith & Bentley-Condit, 2010).
Operational criterion 1d: signallers use a tool as a communica-
tive means to realise a specific goal, while (i) the same goal is
often realised by other signals (with or without tool use), and
(ii) the tool is frequently used in non-communicative contexts
as well.
Examples: orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus pygmaeus) hold leaves
against their mouth to enhance a call as an agonistic display
towards a human observer (Peters, 2001) and chimpanzees
clip leaves loudly for courtship (Nishida, 1980). Both species
also use other signals to realise these goals and manipulate
leaves for non-communicative purposes.
Remarks: the two clauses in the operational criterion aim to
rule out the possibility that the tool use is an integral part of
the signal and may thus be genetically hardwired. Namely,
the tool is not a necessary (clause i), nor sufficient condition
(clause ii) to realise the goal.
Counterevidence for intentional communicative tool use (example): sig-
nallers always use the tool for producing the signal. Different
cricket species, for example, manipulate leaves to enhance
their calls (Forrest, 1982). However, it remains unclear
whether individuals frequently call without these sound-
baffle instruments.
Behavioural hallmark 1e: adjustment of signalling behav-
iour to the sensory perception of recipients
This hallmark demonstrates a belief about how signalling
behaviour affects the recipient by manifesting adjustment of
signalling to the availability of the recipient’s sensory percep-
tion (Carpenter et al., 1998; Liebal et al., 2014). Note that first-
order intentionality only requires a belief that signalling is a
means to affect the recipient. Thus, a signaller can signal
intentionally even if she falsely perceives the recipient as an
inanimate object and believes that seeing his face while ges-
turing realises her goal.
In addition, if the adjustments of signalling are qualified as
elaboration and are made under situations with a similar
arousal level (e.g. all interactions occur in the same context),
this hallmark provides evidence against a ‘common arousal-
based production mechanism’ which triggers different sig-
nalling behaviours according to arousal thresholds
(Graham et al., 2019; see also remarks for operational crite-
rion 1c).
Operational criterion 1e1: testing whether the signaller adjusts
her signalling behaviour according to the environmental con-
ditions in different interactions to increase the probability
that the signal would be detected by a recipient.
Examples: (i) meerkats (Suricata suricatta) produce contact
calls at a higher rate in environmental conditions in which
their group is more dispersed (e.g. call rate is higher during
droughts than wet seasons; Toni et al., 2020); (ii) when in a
forest, signallers access the tree top to produce long-distance
calls; but do not call from a raised position when in the open
field; (iii) adjustment of location: the signaller positions herself
in front of the recipient or changes her body orientation to be
seen by the recipient before producing a visual signal
(Cartmill & Byrne, 2010) or the signaller positions herself
within contact distance of the recipient before producing a
Fig 4. One-to-one versus complex correspondence between signals and goals.
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tactile gesture. For adjustment of the location to be consid-
ered as evidence, it must occur (i) in close association with
the beginning of signalling (e.g. within a few seconds) and
(ii) selectively when the signaller has insufficient visual contact
with the recipient, but not when she is close and in front of the
recipient. Cases in which the recipient is not within the sig-
naller’s visual field or range of physical contact and the latter
changes her location to be seen by or touch the recipient may
be evidence for preparation for signalling (hallmark 2a).
Operational criterion 1e2: testing whether signallers are more
likely to adjust signalling behaviour during interactions in
which the recipient stops being able to perceive the signal
(i.e. withholding signalling behaviour, acting to overcome
the barriers to communication or signalling in another
modality) than in interactions in which the recipient can per-
ceive the signal continuously.
Examples of real-time adjustment: (i) throughout the interac-
tion, the signaller changes her spatial location to ensure that
her signalling body parts are within the recipient’s visual field
(e.g. babbler walk signal in Table 3); (ii) audio signals are pro-
duced louder when the recipient moves away from the signal-
ler; (iii) if visual contact between interlocutors is blocked
during the interaction (e.g. due to vegetation), the signaller
stops using visual signalling and produces an audible signal;
(iv) the signaller uses an audible attention-getter to attract
the visual attention of a recipient and then starts visual
signalling.
Counterevidence for real-time adjustment being present (example): if
the recipient stops perceiving the signal, the signaller con-
tinues signalling or waits passively, even if the recipient was
removed experimentally (tandem running in ants in Table 3).
Operational criterion 1e3: when different signals from different
communicative modalities are used to realise the same goal,
examining whether signallers choose the signal according to
the attentional state of the recipient.
Example: gorillas are more likely to use visual gestures than
tactile gestures when the recipient’s head is oriented towards
the signaller (Genty et al., 2009). However, it is not clear
whether these gestures are used to realise the same goal.
Remarks: this also counts as evidence for adequate inter-
changeable use of signals (behavioural hallmark 1c).
Operational criterion 1e4: adequate usage of attention-getters
[i.e. actions that re/attract the attentional state of the recipi-
ent to the signaller (Liebal et al., 2014; Fischer & Price, 2017)]:
(i) the signaller is more likely to use attention-getters in inter-
actions where recipients do not attend to the signaller before
she starts signalling/a new behaviour (or if recipients stop
attending to the signaller during the interaction) than in
interactions in which recipients attend to the signaller at the
beginning and throughout the interaction, and (ii) various
attention-getters are used across communicative interactions
of the same signal/to realise the same goal.
Remarks: (i) attention-getters may be used before the signal-
ler performs a non-communicative behaviour (e.g. starts
travelling away or playing) or before a subsequent communi-
cative signal. It has been disputed however whether this latter
usage indeed exists [see critique by Liebal et al. (2014); but
counterexamples in Nishida (1980), Miklósi et al. (2000) and
Moura et al. (2014)]. We propose that regardless of whether
attention-getters are acts aimed to trigger an action in the
recipient (Liebal & Call, 2012), signals per se (e.g. with ‘mean-
ing’ of ‘look at me’/‘join me’) or are used to attract the recip-
ient’s attention before an additional signal (Nishida, 1980),
fulfilling criterion 1e4 demonstrates a belief that adjusting
the use of attention-getters helps to realise the desired effect
in the recipient (Liebal et al., 2014).
(ii) Examples of attention-getters: physical: the signaller touches
the recipient in a way that is ‘mechanically ineffective’ to
realise her end goal (Pika & Bugnyar, 2011) but is sufficient
to draw attention to the signaller. Visual: conspicuous move-
ments of the signaller (e.g. dogs turning their head from their
owner to a point of interest: Miklósi et al., 2000). Audible:
orange-winged Amazon (Amazona amazonica) males vocalise
until the female puts her head outside the nest cavity and
then use gestural communication (Moura et al., 2014).
Multi-modal: stone-throwing by bearded capuchin
monkey (Sapajus spp.) females towards males (Falótico &
Ottoni, 2013).
(iii) The second clause in this operational criterion rules
out the possibility that the attention-getter is an integral part
of the signal/non-communicative behaviour. It also demon-
strates further flexibility.
(iv) When possible, signallers may prefer to re-position
themselves within the visual field of the recipient instead of
using attention-getters (Liebal et al., 2014). Interactions in
which the signaller re-position herself within the visual field
of the recipient just before signalling should thus be excluded
from the analysis (see also operational criterion 1e2).
(v) Adequate usage of attention-getters can also be shown
by their selection in accordance with the social and environ-
mental circumstances. For example, by using less-
conspicuous attention-getters when discreet communication
is needed (e.g. to initiate ‘sneaky copulation’) in comparison
to when communication is not discreet.
(vi) Some scholars have argued that attention-getters may
not indicate knowledge about how the signal is perceived
(e.g. Butterworth, 1998; Fischer & Price, 2017). Use of
attention-getters may rather result from conditional learning
that signalling is more efficient when the signaller sees the
recipient’s face (Liebal et al., 2014) combined with learning
what type/s of action/s cause the recipient to look at her.
However, even if the signaller has a false belief that seeing
the recipient’s face makes signalling more efficient, her sig-
nalling is still qualified as goal-directed since the latter only
requires a belief – not necessarily a true belief – that signal-
ling is ameans to realise her goal (DeWit &Dickinson, 2009).
In addition, adequate use of attention-getters as examined
by criterion 1e4 requires a multi-step conditional learning
process. For example, first, a signaller needs to learn that see-
ing the recipient’s face is a precondition for successful com-
munication. Second, the signaller must learn that a specific
behaviour (i.e. the attention-getter) causes the recipient to
look at her (instead of the signaller re-positioning herself
to see the recipient’s face). Third, the signaller may learn to
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use different types of attention-getters for this propose.
Fourth, the signaller needs to select the most appropriate
type of attention-getter in each circumstance. Here, we join
others (e.g. Liebal et al., 2014) in arguing that as much as a
communication system of a species includes various
attention-getters from different communicative modalities,
multi-step conditional learning becomes a less-simple expla-
nation than intentional use of attention-getters that is based
on a belief about how signalling works.
Desire criterion
Behavioural hallmark 1f: adequate persistence of signalling
We consider the investment in signalling (at least in terms
of time, but also energy: Forrest, 1982) until a specific change
is realised as evidence that this change is adaptive to the sig-
naller. Upon demonstration of additional hallmarks of inten-
tionality, we furthermore consider that the realisation of this
change is emotionally desired by the signaller (Carpenter
et al., 1998; De Wit & Dickinson, 2009).
Definition of persistence of signalling: the signaller signals
(by using one or different signals) until her goal is realised
or failure has been clearly indicated.
Operational criterion 1f (adequate persistence of signalling): testing
whether the duration of signalling behaviour (measured from
when the signaller started to produce the first signal until the
end of the last signal aiming to realise the same goal) is shorter
in communicative interactions with complying recipients
than in interactions with non-complying recipients.
Remarks: (i) interactions in which a failure has been clearly
indicated to be due to external factors (e.g. predator encoun-
ter) should be excluded from the analysis.
(ii) Note that this behavioural hallmark examines the pres-
ence of a desire, not beliefs. It is, therefore, compatible with
the interpretation that persistence of signalling is emotionally
driven (Townsend et al., 2017; Graham et al., 2019) and
should not be considered as counterevidence for signalling
being goal-directed.
(iii) For the same reason, this operational criterion exam-
ines whether the signaller persists with signalling behaviour
per se. It is thus irrelevant whether the signaller uses the same
or different signals (i.e. elaboration of signalling) throughout
the interaction as long as they are used to realise the same
goal (Genty et al., 2009).
(iv) To be suitable for continuous signals, in which a single
signalling event lasts until the recipient responds (e.g. object
presentation in Table 3), this operational criterion examines
the duration of signalling behaviour rather than the number
of signalling events.
(v) See Section I.3 for type I error susceptibility of filtering
approaches. In addition to this critique, filtering approaches
to persistence [e.g. defined as “persisting in goal-directed
attempts if the result was not obtained, but ceasing to ges-
ture when it was” (Genty et al., 2009, p. 530)] are susceptible
to type II error by not attributing persistence to interactions
in which the signaller persisted with signalling for a long
time but has terminated signalling when failure to realise
her goal was clearly indicated (e.g. interactions 1 and
10 in Fig. 2).
(vi) Persistence may not be relevant in signals in which the
goal is to transfer information without requiring a beha-
vioural response (i.e. there is no meaning associated with
whether recipients are complying or not); for example, con-
stant contact calls that are produced to preserve group cohe-
sion (e.g. meerkats: Toni et al., 2020). In such cases,
persistence should not be considered as a necessary condition
for intentionality.
Examples: signalling events 1, 9 and 10 versus all other inter-
actions in Fig. 2; babbler walk in Table 3.
Counterevidence for adequate persistence of signalling being present
(examples): (i) the duration of signalling is similar across com-
municative interactions; (ii) signalling behaviour is not signif-
icantly longer in interactions with non-complying recipients
than it is in interactions with complying recipients.
(3) Third step: inferring voluntary signalling
Potential triggers of involuntary signalling are numerous.
Hence, our scheme examines specific triggers, and we
encourage researchers to test as many of them as possible.
We characterise voluntary signalling as signalling that: (i)
is not unconditionally executed by perceiving specific exter-
nal stimuli (i.e. the recipient, his behaviour, signalling by
conspecifics, or other pre-defined external stimuli such as
a predator or a preferred food item); and (ii) is adjusted to
complex circumstances in ways that the information
according to which the signal is to be executed is unlikely
to be entirely encoded in the DNA (Hurford, 2007; Town-
send et al., 2017).
One mechanism that is frequently invoked to explain sig-
nalling is an arousal threshold that triggers involuntary sig-
nalling once it is reached (for review see Fischer &
Price, 2017; Graham et al., 2019). While it is evident that
arousal may involuntarily affect the form of signalling
(Fischer & Price, 2017), humans present an example that
one can voluntarily execute a signal also under emotional
arousal. Evidence for high levels of arousal is, therefore, not
conclusive against voluntary signalling (Liebal et al., 2014).
Some signals may be triggered involuntarily by high arousal
caused by an external stimulus (e.g. predator encounter),
while other signals may only correlate with high arousal since
the external stimulus causes arousal and a need to signal
(Fig. 5). Improved technologies to measure arousal will help
to identify correlations between levels of arousal and signal-
ling (Graham et al., 2019). Nevertheless, they can only pro-
vide strong evidence against involuntary signalling if no
correlation between arousal and signalling is found. On the
other hand, a correlation between signalling and arousal
should not be considered as conclusive evidence for involun-
tary signalling. Behavioural hallmarks of adequately adjust-
able signalling are, therefore, crucial for distinguishing
between voluntary and involuntary signalling.
Execution of signalling is not unconditionally triggered by
specific stimuli
Behavioural hallmark 2a: preparation for signalling
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This hallmark demonstrates that the signaller prepares for
signalling without perceiving the recipient, his behaviour or a
communicative signal from conspecifics.
Operational criterion 2a: in a substantial number of interac-
tions the signaller performs a preparatory act that is neces-
sary for the onset of signalling or for it being successful.
These acts need: (i) to be performed in the absence of a stim-
ulus from the recipient or signals produced by conspecifics;
(ii) not to precede all signalling events; and (iii) to be fre-
quently used also in non-communicative contexts.
Examples: (i) the signaller changes her spatial location to
position herself within the visual field of the recipient just
before she starts producing a visual signal (Liebal
et al., 2004); (ii) the signaller moves to where sound travels
for long distances (e.g. a tree top over the forest canopy)
and soon after her arrival produces long-distance calls.
Remarks: (i) the last two clauses in the operational criterion
demonstrate that the preparatory act is not an integral part of
the signal and not genetically hardwired to be triggered in
specific communicative contexts only. For instance, to solicit
a group member for mating, Arabian babblers (Turdoides
squamiceps) often present a common object in their habitat
(e.g. a twig), which they also pick up daily in non-
communicative acts (e.g. for nest-building; clause iii). In
addition, signallers often pick up an object in the absence of
conspecifics before moving over 15 m to present it to the
recipient (i.e. clause i) and they may solicit mating by other
signals than object presentation (i.e. clause ii) (Ben Mocha &
Pika, 2019). By contrast, bowerbirds (Ptilonorhynchidae)
only collect special items (e.g. blue objects) in bowers and pre-
sent them to females when they pass by (Uy & Borgia, 2000).
The tendency to collect special items may be genetically
coded and driven by sexual selection (Uy & Borgia, 2000)
and their presentation may be an involuntary response to
the appearance of a female.
(ii) Changing of location needs to be made immediately
before the onset of signalling to avoid the possibility that it
was changed for other reasons.
Counterevidence for preparation for signalling being intentional (exam-
ple): the preparatory act is an unusual behaviour that is only
used in this communicative context.
Behavioural hallmark 2b: behavioural dissociations
between the external stimulus and signalling
Instinctive responses are executed immediately after expo-
sure to a specific external stimulus [e.g. calling after a preda-
tor encounter (Crockford et al., 2012; Wheeler &
Fischer, 2012)]. A behavioural, and therefore also temporal,
dissociation between exposure to the stimulus and the onset
of signalling is thus evidence against instinctive signalling.
Operational criterion 2b: after exposure to an external stimu-
lus, (i) the signaller performs at least two different sequential
behaviours before she produces the signal (the signal must be
Fig 5. Casual versus correlative relationships between arousal and signalling behaviour [icons obtained from Freepik (www.flati
con.com)].
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qualitatively different from both these pre-signalling behav-
iours) and (ii) there is considerable within- and/or between-
individual variability in the type of pre-signalling behaviour.
Examples: (i) when left alone with inaccessible food, dogs
perform non-communicative behaviours but vocalise only
when their owner enters the room (Miklósi et al., 2000); (ii)
tandem running in ants and soft huus (Table 3).
Remarks: variation in the behaviours exhibited between the
exposure to the stimulus and the tested signal rules out the
possibility that the pre-signalling behaviours and the signal
are part of a stereotypic response to the stimulus (Crockford
et al., 2012).
Counterevidence for behavioural dissociations between an external
stimulus and signalling being present: (i) the tested signal is always
produced immediately after the exposure to the stimulus;
(ii) the tested signal is always preceded by the same
behaviours.
Behavioural hallmark 2c: adequate coupling and decou-
pling of signals
Coupling and decoupling signals (or a signal and an
attention-getter) in ways that are presumed to help realise
the signaller’s goal demonstrates control about executing
and withholding at least one of the signals.
Operational criterion 2c: testing whether – across communica-
tive interactions of the same individual or across different
individuals – two signals are produced together and sepa-
rately in a way that is presumed to increase the likelihood
of realising the goal.
Example: in an experimental setting, dogs vocalised and
alternated their head between their owner and the location
of hidden food. Some dogs synchronised their vocalisation
with head-alternation by vocalising only when looking
towards the owner, and some dogs by vocalising only when
looking at the hidden food (Miklósi et al., 2000).
Behavioural hallmark 2d: selective signalling according to
the presence of recipients
This hallmark provides evidence against involuntary sig-
nalling by demonstrating that, despite exposure to the stimu-
lus, the signal is selectively produced according to the
presence or absence of recipients (i.e. audience effect: Schel
et al., 2013).
Operational criterion 2d: testing whether, during exposure to a
specific external stimulus (e.g. predator/preferred food item),
the signaller is more likely to produce the signal (e.g. alarm/
food call) when recipients are present/absent than during
exposures in which recipients are absent/present according
to whether the signaller’s goal is to distract/attract the recip-
ient from/to the stimulus.
Examples: (i) headstand signal and soft huus calls in Table 3;
(ii) common marmoset (Callithrix jacchus) produce food calls to
attract absent group members (Vitale et al., 2003); (iii) bottle-
nose dolphins (Tursiops truncatus) point at containers only
when a human diver is present (Pack & Herman, 2006).
Remarks: it has been argued that since arousal levels are
usually higher when in a social group compared to when
alone, the triggering threshold for arousal-based signalling
may only be met in the company of others (Liebal
et al., 2014; Graham et al., 2019). However, this alternative
explanation does not apply for signals that aim to attract
missing recipients (e.g. food calls in common marmosets:
Vitale et al., 2003). For signals that are produced in the pres-
ence of an audience, evidence that signalling is not produced
when informed group members are present will be counter-
evidence against this ‘socially driven arousal’ explanation
(see alarm huus and pointing signals in Table 3).
Counterevidence for selective signalling according to the presence of
recipients being present (examples): (i) the tested signal is produced
regardless of the presence or absence of recipients (see soft
huus in Table 3); (ii) the signaller continues to signal even if
the recipient was experimentally removed (see tandem run-
ning in ants in Table 3).
Behavioural hallmark 2e: between-communities inter-
changeable use of signals
Demonstrating that a signal has different functions
between communities of the same species provides evidence
against the genetic inheritance of signalling (Genty et
al., 2009), as well as evidence for flexible usage.
Operational criterion 2e: identify similar signals in different
communities of the species, then infer and compare the sig-
naller’s goal(s) for the signal in each community (step 1 in this
scheme).
Examples: see Genty et al. (2009) for a transversal study on
within- and between-communities gestural communication
of gorillas and Boesch (1995) for different goals realised by
the leaf-clipping signal in different chimpanzee communities.
Remarks: demonstrating that a signal is used to realise sev-
eral goals within a community (behavioural hallmark 1c)
and that these goals vary among distinct communities of
the species (behavioural hallmark 2e) provides strong evi-
dence against genetic inheritance of the signal and against
the mechanistic explanation (for discussion see Genty
et al., 2009).
Execution of signalling is not completely genetically
determined
Behavioural hallmark 2f: premature termination of signal-
ling behaviour
This hallmark demonstrates violation control over the ter-
mination of signals that consist of a specific sequence of differ-
ent actions.
Operational criterion 2f: testing whether the realisation of the
signaller’s goal (or its onset) is followed by termination of sig-
nalling before completion.
Counterevidence for premature termination of signalling behaviour
being present: once started, the entire sequence of actions is exe-
cuted regardless of the recipient’s behaviour.
Behavioural hallmark 2g: signalling is not sex-specific
This hallmark examines whether a signalling behaviour is
exclusively produced by males or females in species with no
anatomical limitations for both sexes to produce the signal
and where both sexes would seem to benefit from using
it. Since intentionality is a general cognitive mechanism,
sex-specific signalling is counterevidence for intentionality
and supports the view that the behaviour is genetically
hardwired.
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Example: in species where both parents provide similar
parental care, both sexes would benefit from producing a sig-
nal that solicits offspring to follow them (see babbler walk sig-
nal in Table 3).
Remarks: (i) the performance of a signal by both sexes does
not provide evidence in favour of intentionality since signal-
ling can still be genetically hardwired at the species level.
This hallmark can thus only provide evidence against inten-
tional signalling.
(ii) Due to anatomical differences, different signals may be
more suitable for males and females for realising the same
goal and this should not count as counterevidence for volun-
tary signalling. For example, females of some bird species
solicit mating by bending over in front of the male (Davies
et al., 1996; Ben Mocha & Pika, 2019). As this posture is a
pre-condition to enable mating, imitating it may be a more
efficient signal for females, but not for males.
Behavioural hallmark 2h: selective production/withhold-
ing of signalling according to complex conditions
Here, complex conditions are unlikely to be entirely
encoded in the DNA (Hurford, 2007). In the following, we
present two examples of such conditions.
Operational criterion 2h1: audience effect: testing whether the
signal is more likely to be produced and/or withheld under
specific audience composition [e.g. according to dominance
rank, kin relation, or degree of social bond (Miklósi
et al., 2000; Schel et al., 2013)].
Remarks: (i) withholding signalling in the presence of spe-
cific recipients can be shown, for instance, by documenting
termination of signalling when specific individuals appear.
(ii) it is important to rule out the possibility that the presence of
specific individuals involuntarily triggers or prevents the tested
signalling behaviour. For example, by showing that the signal
is not produced in all situations in which these individuals are
present (Schel et al., 2013) or that dominant group members
do not withhold signalling because they are being attacked by
subordinate groupmembers (see object presentation in Table 3).
(iii) This operational criterion may not rule out the alterna-
tive explanation that signalling is triggered by higher arousal
levels in specific social contexts since, for example, the pres-
ence of higher-ranking individuals may be more stressful
for the signaller (Liebal et al., 2014).
Examples: (i) dogs gaze and vocalise when their owner is
present (Miklósi et al., 2000); (ii) in chimpanzees communities
where leaf clipping is used to initiate copulation, signallers
terminate signalling upon arrival of a more dominant indi-
vidual (Nishida, 1980; Matsumoto-Oda & Tomonaga,
2005); (iii) alarm huus in Table 3.
Counterevidence for complex audience effect being present: soft huus
in Table 3.
Operational criterion 2h2: selective signalling in accordance
with the signaller’s perception of the recipient’s behaviour
and/or knowledge (Kaplan, 2011; Crockford et al., 2012).
Examples: alarm huus, waa barks and pointing signals in
Table 3.
Remarks: this operational criterion can provide evidence
against the alternative explanation that signalling is triggered
by a higher arousal level in social contexts (Liebal et al., 2014;
Graham et al., 2019). See also remarks for behavioural hall-
mark 2d, operational criterion 2h1, and pointing in Table 3.
Form of signalling is not completely genetically determined.
Behavioural hallmarks 1b, 1d and 1e as described above.
(4) Fourth step: signalling behaviour realises the
signaller’s goal
Behavioural hallmark 3: signalling is likely to change the
recipient’s behaviour in ways that are conducive to realising
the signaller’s goal
Operational criterion 3: post-signalling, the recipient is more
likely to change her behaviour in ways that are conducive
to realising the signaller’s goal, in comparison to when the
signaller performs a ‘control behaviour’ (i.e. a similar behav-
iour to the tested signal; e.g. a non-communicative action
that is physically similar to the tested gesture).
Example: object presentation in Table 3.
III. DISCUSSION
The theoretical framework of our scheme follows the tradi-
tional contrast between the ‘mechanistic’ and ‘intentional’
mechanisms that may underlie signalling behaviour
(Dennett, 1983; Call & Tomasello, 2007; Liebal
et al., 2014). Lacking direct access to these mechanisms, the
scheme examines their manifestation in behaviour and differ-
entiates between more- and less-adjustable signals and com-
municative modalities. Hence, even if one rejects the ability
to differentiate between these underlying mechanisms, we
argue that our differentiation between more- and less-
adjustable signals is an objective alternative to categorising
signalling behaviours of animals according to their similarity
to human communication. Furthermore, despite not present-
ing a conclusive test for inferring intentional signalling in ani-
mals, our scheme and each of its operational criteria are
significantly more rigorous than those traditionally used to
infer intentionality in pre-linguistic children [for examples,
compare with Bates (1979), Coggins & Carpenter (1981)
and Carpenter et al. (1998)].
Identifying species that are incapable of intentional signal-
ling (and in which communicative modalities) is an integral
part of generating and testing hypotheses about the evolution
of intentional communication. We therefore call for greater
efforts to publish negative results. Since a species can produce
intentional and non-intentional signals, we propose consider-
ing a species as incapable of first-order intentional signalling
in a specific modality upon evidence of non-intentional sig-
nalling in two signals from this modality.
We suggest three directions in which the presented scheme
can be expanded. First, other communicative modalities
than the visual and auditory may be used intentionally, and
the expansion of the scheme to these modalities is important
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for enabling research on diverse taxa (e.g. olfactory signalling
in the Bovidae).
Second, the definition of first-order intentional signalling
(‘voluntary signalling in pursuit of a cognitively represented
goal’) can be generalised to non-communicative acts by
replacing ‘signalling’ with ‘acting’. Comparing actors’
behaviour between successful and unsuccessful attempts to
realise a goal (instead of interactions with complying versus
non-complying recipients) would then test first-order inten-
tionality in non-communicative acts (e.g. food caching and
food sharing: Burkart & van Schaik, 2020).
Third, some behavioural hallmarks in the scheme also
characterise ostensive signalling (e.g. attention-getters; for
discussion see Fischer & Price, 2017). That is, when the sig-
naller also expresses the very fact of having communicative
intentions (Grice, 1957). Parts of this scheme can thus be inte-
grated with previous ideas (e.g. Sievers & Gruber, 2016; Ben
Mocha & Pika, 2019) to develop a framework to infer osten-
sive signalling in animals.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We present a unified, operational-level scheme with 16 beha-
vioural hallmarks and 20 operational criteria to infer first-
order intentional signalling following the three conditions
proposed by Townsend et al. (2017). In so doing, we aim to
facilitate rigorous and systematic comparison of first-order
intentional signalling across studies, species and communica-
tive modalities.
Even rigorous hallmarks of goal-directed and voluntary sig-
nalling can be explained by alternative mechanisms
(Dennett, 1983; Liebal et al., 2014). Furthermore, human sig-
nalling occasionally lacks some hallmarks of intentionality
(Bates, 1979; Coggins & Carpenter, 1981) or is performed in
a non-intentional manner (De Wit & Dickinson, 2009). We
thus urge the presentation of ‘converging’ evidence before
concluding that a species is capable of first-order intentionality
(Townsend et al., 2017; Graham et al., 2019).Our scheme facil-
itates this in two ways. First, by testing multiple hallmarks, it
can establish accumulative evidence for adjustability that
makes first-order intentionality the most plausible mechanism
for the examined signal. Second, by applying this scheme to
more than one signal from the same communicative modality,
it can investigate whether such adjustability is the result of a
general cognitive mechanism of that species.
Testing as many operational criteria as possible comes
with the risk of finding a positive result by chance (i.e. type
I error). This is particularly likely to happen when intention-
ality is assigned if signalling fulfils at least one out of several
behavioural hallmarks (e.g. Cartmill & Byrne, 2010; Hobai-
ter & Byrne, 2014). We therefore highlight the importance
of reporting negative evidence for the hallmarks tested,
thereby promoting a transparent and balanced evaluation
of the overall evidence for intentionality at the signal level.
The presented scheme is not meant to be exhaustive.
Rather, comparative research will benefit from the addition
of diverse hallmarks and operational criteria to infer inten-
tionality. Throughout the scheme, we thus discuss core ratio-
nales (and limitations) in order to facilitate suggestions of
further behavioural hallmarks and case-specific modifica-
tions while maintaining these core rationales and valid com-
parison across studies.
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